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Article 5

THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF LAW*

Lawrence Josepht

I.
In an essay that I wrote almost a decade ago, Theories
of Poetry, Theories of Law,' I explore and compare, on the one
hand, the language of literary texts (especially poetry), and, on
the other, the language of legal texts (especially judicial
opinions). My analysis of the language of literary texts starts
with an essay by Raymond Williams, When Was Modernism?'
Modernist writers, according to Williams, "denaturalized
language." They broke "the allegedly prior view that language
is either a clear, transparent glass or mirror." They also made
"abruptly apparent in the texture of narrative the problematic
status of the author and his authority" A Modernist text is
"self-reflexive." It "assumes the cent[er] of the public and
aesthetic stage."3 The self (or subject, in the sense of the self as
subject) assumes an objective (a "public and aesthetic")
dimension. The language of the subject is formed into an object
of aestheszs-an object its listener or reader will feel or
perceive.
William Carlos Williams, in a piece he wrote in the
early 1930s on Marianne Moore's poetry, put it this way"Moore undertakes in her work to separate the poetry from the
subject entirely-like all the moderns. In this she has been
*@2002 Lawrence Joseph. All Rights Reserved.
t1 Professor of Law, St. John's Umversity School of Law.
Lawrence Joseph, Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1227
(1993).
2Raymond

Williams, When Was Modernism?, 175 NEW LEFT REV. 48 (1989).

3 Joseph, supra note 1, at 1229; Williams, supra note 2, at 48-50.
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rarely successful and this is important." Moore cannot
completely separate her poetry from its subject matter because
it is impossible to do so. Why? Because a poet uses language.
Because language is a human act, by its very nature it includes
the voice of the person who speaks or writes it. Moore "never
falls from the place inhabited by poems."5 The space inhabited
by the poet's self-her subject matter and her expression-is
physical, sensual, a place both subjective and objective, formed
by the poet into an object of her expression, the poem.
Christa Wolf, quoting Anna Seghers, speaks of the
writer as "'the curious crossing point where object becomes
subject and turns back into object." "The reservoir that writers
draw on in their writing," Wolf says, "is experience.6
Experience "mediates between objective reality and the
authorial subject."7 Although the experience that Wolf speaks
of is "socially meaningful," it still must take into account the
"importance of the subjective dimension."8 Writing is a process
that runs continuously alongside life. By, through, and in her
writing, a writer becomes, and is, deeply involved with the
world. Indeed, the writer must be prepared to experience as
much "unrelenting" exposure as possible not only to the world's
realities, but also to the changing realities both she and her
subject matter inexorably undergo. This interaction between
the writer and her material (material which includes the text
itself) forms "a new reality," one different from "the one you
saw before," one in which "everything is interconnected and
fluid."9 The created text shatters expressions that are ossified,
reified--"pre-ordained by . . . ideology."" The individual
author's involvement with her subject reflects truths deeper
than the invisible truths of the subjective self, or "I," truths
deeper than the reigning "objective" truths of politics, ideology,
or economics. The most authentic expressions of subjectivity
and, or, objectivity are those shaped, formed, and given
4 Joseph, supra note 1, at 1233; WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, IMAGINATIONS

312 (1970).
'Joseph, supra note 1, at 1233; WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 312.
'CHRISTA WOLF, THE FOURTH DIMENSION: INTERVIEWS WITH CHRISTA WOLF
21-24 (1988).
7

Id.

'Id.
'Id. at 22.
'0 Joseph, supra note 1, at 1233; WOLF, supra note 6, at 21-24.
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meaning by a writer's unrelenting imaginative intervention
into the world in which all of us live.
II.
Historically, jurisprudists, judges, and practitioners
alike assumed that legal language was objective, neutral, and
verifiable. The first theorists to challenge this orthodoxy were
the legal realists.1 ' The realists' project raised the status of
legal thought from objectively presumed, formalized rules onto
a different doctrinal plane of thought (one presumed equally
objective) based not on the "transcendental nonsense" of a
"mechanical jurisprudence," but, instead, on policies grounded
in social, political, and economic realities.' The philosophical
or literary dimensions of legal language were not realist
concerns.13
The subjective quality of legal language did not become
a jurisprudential issue until the mid-1970s. By the early
eighties, critical writing on the objective and subjective
dimensions of legal language had become highly sophisticated,
extensive, and far-reaching. Questions about the objective
meaning of legal texts dominated American legal thought. 4
In 1983, Robert Cover's The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative appeared in the
Harvard Law Review. 5 Cover declared: "No set of legal
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives
that locate it and give it meaning ... ."16 Legal prescriptions,
"even when embodied in a legal text," cannot escape their
"origin and end in experience, in the narratives that are the
trajectories plotted upon material reality by our imagination.""
Law is a system of "tension"; it is "a bridge linking a concept of
a reality to an imagined alternative-that is, . . . a connective
" Joseph, supra note 1, at 1234-35.
12 Id.

at 1235; see Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional

Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935).

13 Joseph, supra note 1, at 1235; see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE

FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 2, 286 (2001).
14Joseph, supranote 1, at 1235-41.
1s Robert

M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:Nomos and

Narratiue,97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).

" Id. at 4 n.3.
17Id. atS.
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between two states of affairs, both of which can be represented
in their normative significance only through the devices of
narrative.""8 Cover's vision of the language of law as
imaginatively plotted and projected onto material reality by
those both individually and collectively involved in the legal
system was monumental, placing the subjective and objective
complexities of legal language, and law itself, into full critical
play.
Two years after Nomos and Narrative, Robin West saw
that a new strain of legal criticism had arisen, one "utopian,"
"visionary," or "aesthetic" in character. 9 But West also pointed
out that the first person narratives employed by the authors of
the new criticism were expressed in a language quite different
from the language required of judges, legislators, and
practicing lawyers. Those who write legal criticism "do not
decide cases, vote on bills, or undertake the representation of
clients and hence the furtherance of those clients' interest."
Legal theorists do not make law.2" Although, as West says,
"jiludges, legislators, and lawyers" cannot escape their
"personal histories when formulating a theory of human nature
and social interaction upon which to ground their work," they
must, if they are "acting responsibly,.. . keep these narrative
instincts separate from the act of lawmaking, or at least weigh
them against other institutional concerns."2' The making and
practicing of law requires, at some point, some process of
objectification.
III.
One strategy behind Theories of Poetry, Theories of Law
was to tackle the notion of legal objectivity by an aesthetic
analysis of language. I focused on the aesthetics of poetry
because poetry-the most condensed form of literary verbal
expression--contains virtually every dimension of language.
The common ground that I discovered between law and
literature seems simple: Both involve issues of language, as
18Id. at 9.
'9Robin West, Jurisprudenceas Narrative:An Aesthetic Analysis of Modem
Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145, 203 (1985).
20Id. at 211.
21 Id.
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well as issues of how language is, or ought to be, expressed. I
found, however, the dissimilarities between law and literature
equally critical. Terry Eagleton has spoken of what he calls the
"true sublime" in writing, the "infinite, inexhaustible,
heterogeneity of . . [a] sensuous, non-functional delight in
concrete particularity [that flows] from the dismantling of
abstract rational exchange-value."2 2 In a post-Modernist, postMarxist world, a sense remains that certain forms of
imaginative expression profoundly resist being completely
reified by processes of commodification. "[W]e have to find a
way to resist . . . commodification in the letter of the text,"
Eagleton says, in the same way, for example, that "Keats found
a way of resisting commodification by sensuousness, by a kind
of shameless overlaying of the language which brought down
on [Keats'] head charges of cockney vulgarity from the
guardians of literary consciousness."2
Is it
possible for legal language to resist
commodification in the same way that the sensuous language
of, let's say, a poem by Emily Dickinson, resists it? Forms of
literature do not reify; what, in fact, arguably makes a form of
verbal expression literature is that literature is language that
resists reification because of how it is expressed. However,
unlike the language of literature, the language of those who
make and practice law (the language of judges, legislators, and
practicing lawyers) is, at a definite point and to a great extent,
socially, economically, politically, and institutionally reified
into forms of language to be known and obeyed, executed and
enforced, bought and sold. Expressions of law embody, and are
embodied in-integrate and are integrally a part of-the
practice of violence, the allocation of power, the distribution of
money, and the dispensing of privilege (which in turn bestows
wealth). Law, like literature, is a language game, but, unlike
literature, the object of the game is not to express forms of
sensuousness or feeling. The language of law embodies
violence, power, and money. It is a language game complexly
unique both in its expressions and in the consequences of its
expressions.
Terry Eagleton, Action in the Present:An Interview with Terry Eagleton, in
POLYGRAPH: VERSIONS OF THE PRESENT: MODERNISMIPOSTMODERNISM 30, 34 (Henry
Schwarz & Richard Dienst eds., 1989).
23Id. at 35-36.
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IV.
At the heart of Steven Winter's magnus opus, A
Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind, is a radical
insight: Law, Winter says, exists within a complex reflexive
relationship between experience, imagination, and meaning.2
There is no law without the reflexive, imaginative relationship
of its participants, both individually and collectively. Law, in
concept and in reality, is neither more nor less than the
language of our individual and collective contributions to what
law means.2
Because law is expressed in language, and because
language is in part subjective, the language of law is in part
subjective. The language of law requires a speaker, or
speakers, a voice, or voices-the human and social experience
of an "I" or a "we." Law's language is, however, also in part
objective: Subjective expression is variously structured by the
world that the speaker inhabits, shaped by metaphorical
"objects," formulations of humanness deeply embodied in the
world that gives rise to their expression. These formulations
are objectified by the expectations of legal participants and by
their apprehension of the social world, and through the
expression of legal rules which, of course, take shape in
language. This objectification of legal thought in language
necessitates some degree of reification. However (and it is an
important however), because this reification requires thinking,
speaking subjects-and because the law must be spoken,
written, or enacted by a person or persons-the forms, or
reifications,
of
legal
language
are,
in
essence,
phenomenological.
A Clearing in the Forest exposes and rejects reifications
of complex social practices and understandings which, as
reifications, fail to take into account the deeply physical and
experiential, or phenomenological, realities of meaning. Law,
which requires meaning, is, as Winter demonstrates, created
by and within complex interactions of mind, body, and the
world. These interactions come into existence through ongoing,
deepening, imaginative expressions of language. Even the most
24WINTER,
21Id.

supranote, 13, at 215.
at 214-15, 346-51.
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shopworn of jurisprudential examples, H.L.A. Hart's "no
vehicles in the park," becomes for Winter an extended
meditation on the cultural history of the park as conceived by
republican theorists, and transformed by successive waves of
working class park-goers and Progressive planners.26 Law, as it
is today, is a distillation of history, culture, and social conflict
critically deficient in its expression, a faded residue of a rich,
human life-world-a world toward which the law merely
gestures. The condensed verbal form of the legal rule-unlike
the condensed emotional sensuousness of a poem-expresses
less than it knows, yet means more than it can express. Legal
thought that recognizes this can get at, if not transcendental
truths, then at least those truths that arise out of the
unrelenting exposure of the mind and imagination to the
objective realities of law. Or, to paraphrase a passage from
Wallace Stevens' poem "Chocoura To Its Neighbors" (quoted by
Winter2 7): To speak law, as lawyers, humanly, from the height
or from the depth of human things, that is law's acutest
speech.
V.
Drame, a book of prose by Phillipe Sollers, is, in its
English translation Event, followed by an essay, Drame, Poeme,
Roman (Event, Poem, Novel), by Roland Barthes.28 In a
footnote, Barthes observes:

26

Id. at 201-06, 263-66.

Id. at xvii. The passage from Chocoura To Its Neighbors that Winter quotes
is: "To say more than human things with human voice] That-cannot be; to say human
things with more/ Than human voice, that, also, cannot be; To speak humanly from
the height or from the depth/ Of human things/ that is acutest speech." Id. (quoting
Wallace Stevens, Chocoura to its Neighbors, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE

STEVENS 300 (1954)).
PHILLIPE SOLLERS, DRAME (Editions de Seuil, 1965); PHILLIPE SOLLERS,
EVENT (Bruce Benderson & Ursule Mollinaro trans., 1986) (with an essay by Roland
Barthes).
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It is in fact possible to read Event like a very beautiful poem, the
indistinct celebration of language and of the woman beloved, the
path of one toward the other, like Dante's Vita Nova in another era:
Event may be the infinite metaphor of "I love you," which is the
single transformation found in all poetry.29

"Remember," Winter says in A Clearing in the Forest, "that
metaphor is a conceptual mapping from a source domain to a
target domain that preserves inferential structure."0 Put in
Winter's terms, Barthes' insight is that "I love you" is one of
poetry's deepest sources; Event essentially is a "conceptual
mapping" of "I love you" expressed (or inferentially structured)
within the projected domain of the book itself. The book is the
infinite metaphor: The metaphor is the endlessly profound
cognitive mapping, by, in, and through expression, of the
primary human issue of "I love you." Metaphor is the
transformation through expression of intrinsically human
domains.
VI.
In a recent essay, Taking Moral Argument Seriously,
Robin West takes on what she calls Ronald Dworkin's
antipositivist conception of law. Dworkin's jurisprudence is,
West says, moral:3 For Dworkin, "[tihe legal actor is loyal to
law, principally understood in light of a conception of justice,
not positive law as authoritatively pronounced by a court or
legislative body. Legal argument, in turn, is the practice that
gives daily voice and substance to this distinctively moral
loyalty."32 The jurisprudential function of the moral principles
identified by Dworkin render the law not only determinate, but
also substantively just. Yet, West maintains, "both Dworkin
and his critics may be wrong to think that justice requires such
a high degree of determinacy."3 If law incorporates moral
principles of justice, then the lawyer, as well as the judge,
while holding and articulating the law, is, essentially, an
29Id. at 87.
30 WINTER, supra note 13, at 31.
31 Robin West, Taking Moral Arguments Seriously, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 499

(1999).

(2Id.
3Id.

at 501.
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architect of justice and of a just society, as well as being an
enforcer of order.34
If, as West says, law incorporates moral principles of
justice, then the question "what is morally just?" is-like "I
love you" in poetry-an essential source domain of law. From it
emanate conceptually mapped metaphors of what moral justice
means. The domain of metaphors-the domain of expressions
of what is moral and just-is structured both by its deep,
human source and by the imaginative depth of its expression.
However, as West continues, in American law today "we have
no developed account," no developed expression, of
what even the narrow virtue of legal justice might be or of what
traits of character it requires, what view of the person it entails, or
what kind of society might best facilitate its dispensation.... [We
have no developed or competing understandings of the substantive
of various cognitions of substantive, social, or
legal consequences
35
political justice.

In American law today, there is no recognition of the
cognitive fact that law must rest on our conceptual mapping
and expression of what is morally just. It is therefore
incumbent on legal educators-if they are serious in their
pedagogical and scholarly missions-to "develop, debate, sift
through, improve upon, dwell on, preserve, learn, and teach, as
an integral part of law, competing and credible theories of
justice."36 The world of law, of the lawyer and of the law
scholar, should be a world where the implications of a moral
conception of justice can be self-consciously traced and
expressed. As West observes:
[Ilt is hard to think of any group, professional or otherwise, other
than lawyers, with the expertise and the professional inclination to
work through in a detailed way the implications of various
understandings of justice for various doctrinal areas of law. There is
no reason, in short, for lawyers not to at least acknowledge the

subject ofjustice as peculiarly within their province. It is a curiosity,
and maybe even a scandal, that lawyers in this century have not

done so.

34 Id. at

502.

5Id. at 503.
"West, supra note 31, at 502.
"Id. at 505.
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The legal profession and legal academy, therefore, not only
ought to, but must, take seriously the project of objectified
moral argument."
What lawyers, in other words, must do is develop,
debate, sift through, improve upon, dwell on, preserve, learn,
and teach, through individual and collectivized expressions,
the moral bases of justice. "Our refusal to do so over the last
thirty years," West declares, "has left us with unpalatable
alternatives [:1"
[T]he nihilist insistence on the left that all there is in the social
world worth pondering is power; the libertarian insistence on the
right that all that can be justified is the satisfaction through market
mechanisms of desire; and the fundamentalist and generally
religious-based claim that the authority for moral truth must come
from not just extra-legal but extra-human sources. These stances
cannot possibly yield theories of justice, or moral truth, sufficient to
ground morally compelling legal arguments. We know this and as a
result have eschewed the project of justice altogether. As a result we
have created an academic and professional world void of any sense of
virtue and even ignorant of the competing possible conceptions of the
virtue of justice that at least in the eyes of others ought to 39be the
defining virtue of the legal profession and legal academy both.

Or, as Winter might say, our present theoretical
orthodoxies, by ignoring the deeply human issues of what is
moral and just, fail in meaningful ways to connect subject and
object. They present no alternatives except, on the one hand,
those theories of external-objective--constraint, or, on the
40
other, theories bottomed on pure, unrestrained subjectivity.
Our present theoretical orthodoxies fail to explore the cognitive
dimensions of language and experience by which law is
sustained-fail to build for us a bridge across which to connect
the subjective and objective meanings of justice and morality.
Or, as West, echoing Winter, might say, our present theoretical
orthodoxies fail to dereify our understandings of justice and
moral truth, fail to show us how the legal and moral language
of justice is "constituted and sustained... in the forms of life
that give meaning to our categories, concepts, and values, " 3Id.

at 515.

39Id.
'0
41

WINTER, supra note 13, at 11, 104-05, 132-33, 353.

Id.at 332.
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fail to reconcile our values and contingencies in a way that
embodies a "true humanism"4 2 which "we ourselves have
made.' The subject and object of law-both in practice and in
theory-is found in our language and our expressions of moral
justice, expressions that arise out of our minds and our
imaginations, from our senses and within our experiences,
within the unrelenting pressures of a world of money and
violence and power which we, as lawyers, choose to inhabit.

42 Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J. L. &
HUMANITIES 233, 245 (1994) ("What is perhaps proper to our time is to disassociate
humanism from the idea of a humanity fully guaranteed by natural law, and not only
reconcile consciousness of human values and consciousness of the infrastructures
which keep them in existence, but to insist on their inseparability.") (quoting MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS (Richard C. McCleary trans., 1964)).
WINTER, supra note 13, at 357.

